In recent times, sensor security and reliability has become an important concern due to the growing applicability of sensor-based networking infrastructures. In this paper, we present here a novel multi-layer framework to protect confidentiality and integrity of data stored on sensors. The framework allows automatic and fast development of security extensions to the sensor operating system.
Introduction
Sensor networks consisting of several thousands of computing devices, called sensors, are being widely used in situations where using traditional networking infrastructures is practically infeasible. These applications include those which are based in remote physical locations or in hostile enemy territories. Their adoption in such applications is primarily due to the characteristics of the sensor -low cost, small sized, portable, battery operated devices that communicate through a wireless network using radio signals. While on the plus side these properties allow such networks to be deployed easily without much physical supervision, on the minus side, they restrict the computational power of the sensors. In fact, sensors run bare-bones software with very small foot-prints. As a consequence, such networks face several challenges which are unique to them. One such challenge is in securing them -a key problem since several sensor network applications such as military environments rely on transmitting classified data. Most of the current state of the art in sensor network security research is focused on developing protocols for secure routing [14, 20, 23, 24] and transmission of data in an encrypted format on the network [12, 24] . However, in addition to securing data in transit on networks, security of the operating system that runs on a sensor is also critical. This is because, sensors may store security critical data such as, shared secret keys to send and receive packets confidentially across the sensor network. Compromise of a sensor OS will lead to loss of such data, possibly compromising other sensors as well. Figure 4 illustrates some of these threats for the popular TinyOS [17] sensor operating system. However, in-spite of the threats, not much work has been done in securing sensor OSes. Recent research [25] ensures security of data on a sensor by using a probabilistic model in which a limit is placed on the number of sensors sharing a common secret key, thus reducing the fallout when the key is compromised. While the probabilistic model is efficient in containing the damage due to an attack, it does not address the larger problem of protecting critical data which may not always be secret keys -hence, security mechanisms local to a sensor are required. Moreover, since sensor networks consist of thousands of sensors, we believe that enforcing confinement of shared keys within small groups of sensors is difficult - [25] does not address this issue. [14] proposes the application of anomaly/misuse based intrusion detection systems for sensor security. While this idea has merit, it is not clear how sensors can be managed to deal with (a) effects of high false alarms in anomaly based detection and (b) the need for constant updates to signatures in misuse based intrusion detection.
Salient contributions.
In this paper we present a framework for TinyOS that (a) secures it against known and unknown attacks without requiring any supervision, (b) provides a software tamper-resistant lock on sensors, which ensures that in face of repeated attacks, the sensor self-destructs itself before its data can be compromised and (c) improves the efficiency of TinyOS. The key contributions of our work are: A behavioral control model which automatically captures the actual behavior of the TinyOS and detects attacks as deviations from the actual behavior. In this paper we discuss an algorithm to generate these models by static analysis of TinyOS binaries and a novel optimization algorithm that increases the runtime efficiency of such models. A framework for developing security extensions for TinyOS. The framework supports different types of security extensions. In addition, it is computationally efficient. Specifically, experiments on its performance on Linux daemons such as ftpd and httpd, demonstrated that it introduces overheads of less than 5% and moreover, the overhead was independent of the complexity of the security extension [19] . In this paper, we discuss its application to the domain of TinyOS. In addition to security, the framework also supports extensions which make the execution of TinyOS more efficient. It is based on the observation that a substantial amount of power in TinyOS is spent in accepting an external event, identifying it and dispatching it for processing [3] . Hence, by "predicting" the set of all events that can occur next, the framework improves the efficiency. We begin our discussion with an example of a TinyOS installation in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss our framework in detail followed by conclusion in Section 4.
Example TinyOS application
TinyOS is an event-based operating system with a very small footprint (£ 400Kb) [17] . TinyOS applications have two entities: components which implement the application functionality and provide bi-directional interfaces to access it ; and a wiring specification which assembles components together by defining how and which components can interact with each other using the interfaces provided by the components. The applications are written in a high-level language called nesC. An example of a TinyOS installation is shown in Figure 1 Figure 4 illustrates some of the possible threats on TinyOS. Key vulnerabilities include the compromise of the wiring specification and the classified/secret data stored on the TinyOS. Efficiency Issues. Key issues which affect efficiency of TinyOS application: (a) time spent in waiting for an external event (such as input data or from another sensor) to occur and identifying that event, and (b) unused components consume power if they are run. Layer 2: Security Extension allows users to customize/develop security extensions to restrict access to the protected component. In this architecture, command invocations to the protected component are intercepted by the SE-CURITY BROKER and then passed to the Layer 1. If Layer 1 detects an attack, the SECU-RITY BROKER uses an event implemented by this layer to launch an appropriate response, for instance, one which disallows the command. When it is not an attack, the command is dispatched to Layer 2 (if present) and executes the security extensions for that command. Note that the layered approach separates the detection mechanisms that can be deployed automatically (Layer 1) from the one that requires user-defined security extensions (Layer 2). This allows, for the former to act as a filter for inputs to the latter layer -a computationally intensive layer, thereby, adding to the efficiency of the overall mechanism of SECURITY BROKER. EVENT PREDICTOR: To improve efficiency in terms of power usage, [3] suggests that the TinyOS should be in a passive mode for most of the time. However, when an event occurs, identifying that event and determining the action to take makes a sensor move from passive to active mode leading to increased power consumption. By using the policy specification language mentioned above, users can define the next set of possible events that a TinyOS is likely to see. This will allow faster identification and deployment of functions to handle the event. We discuss the architecture in detail in the next sections.
Security Broker: Control Behavioral Model
The central theme of Layer 1 is the development of a control behavioral model (CBM) that is precise and can be employed for fast identification of incorrect observable behavior. We present in this section the existing techniques applied to identify such models followed by a novel technique for generating precise CBM which can be used efficiently.
Typically, program control behavior is represented using control flow graphs (CFG), a graph consisting of states represented by program counter values and interstate transitions labeled by system calls. Such graphs are generated by static analysis of TinyOS. Filtering proceeds by run-time monitoring of observable actions. Deviations of sequence of observable action from the control flow graph is flagged as anomalous (potentially harmful). Two important requirements of this technique, as eluded in [10] , are 1. Precision: the model must capture all possible sequence of actions that are deemed as correct system behavior and nothing else. This stems from the underlying requirements that correct behavior must not be classified as erroneous and anomalous behavior must not go unnoticed. 2. Efficiency: monitoring observable behavior must incur minimal overhead in time and space usage.
Unfortunately, enhancing both precision and efficiency is a difficult, if not impossible, task owing to the fact the precision requires incorporating minute details of the system in the model which in turns slows down the monitoring phase thereby reducing efficiency. We present, in this paper, a novel approach which enhances precision without incurring loss of efficiency.
Background. Each procedure, represented by a CFG, has an entry state and can have multiple exit states (depending on the relative position of return statements in the procedure). 
Context Insensitivity in CFG.
A correct program path with respect to its call-return pattern requires that when a procedure exits it returns control to the site of its most recent call [18] . A CFG model does not keep track of location to which a program control should return once a procedure exits, i.e., context information of a call is lost. Such context insensitivity classifies paths with unmatched calls and returns as valid execution sequences in the program. An example of such infeasible path in the global CFG is illustrated using dotted lines in Figure 6(b) . CFG model does not to classify the transition from exit state of line to return location at end as incorrect and hence fails to detect the in-feasibility. Note that, an infeasible path results from one/more bad edges from the callee's exit state to the a return location of one of its potential callers.
A malicious user manipulating the executing program may use such edges in the model as an exploit
- [10] Context Sensitive Model: Push-Down Systems. Pushdown system (PDS) captures, in addition to the intraprocedural control structure, the correct call-return pattern (context) of the program under normal circumstances. This is achieved by explicitly keeping track of the execution stack of the program whose behavior is being modeled by the PDS. Unlike CFG transition, which is between a pair of states, a PDS transition represents the change in the execution stack of the program: tos¨© set where tos is the current top-of-stack and the set represents the sequence of program locations pushed into the stack after the statement at tos is executed.
In the recent past, a number of efficient techniques has been proposed to analyze programs with (recursive) procedures using their push-down system representation [6, 8] . Following these lines, [10] proposed a runtime monitoring technique IDS using PDS. Whenever the monitored program makes a jump from one procedure to another, the return location in the caller is pushed in a stack (we will refer to this as monitor-stack). On the other hand, if the monitored program exits a procedure and goes to a state in another procedure, the execution is deemed correct only when the destination state is present in the top of the monitor-stack. In the event the transition is allowed, the top of monitor-stack is popped out.
Going back to the example in Figure 6 (c), every interprocedural transition is labeled by the operation on the monitor stack (push(A), pop(A) etc). An interprocedural transition is feasible only when the operation on the monitor-stack is feasible. Such restriction removes the presence of infeasible paths caused by unmatched calls and returns in the model.
Space Inefficiency in PDS.
The PDS-based monitoring technique suffers from a major drawback of imposing a significantly large space overhead. This is attributed to the fact, the monitor-stack is potentially as large as the execution stack of the program being monitored. [10] proposes an optimization technique which makes the PDS monitoring mechanism practically usable at the cost of losing precision to certain degree. The optimization, termed as hybrid model monitoring scheme, requires finitizing or pre-fixing the size of the monitorstack, thereby reducing the space usage. However, the technique involving hybrid models only allows contextsensitive monitoring for non-recursive procedure; the call-return context is not considered for recursive ones. In this section, we propose a novel technique which is as precise as PDS-model monitoring technique and is comparable to CFG-model monitoring technique in terms of space usage, and thus caters to the basic requirements for securing TinyOS. At its core, the technique is based on introducing a set of auxiliary integer variables one each for call transition in a CFG. We will refer to these variables as PROcedure conteXt Indicator (Proxi) and the corresponding CFG as proxi-annotated control-flow graph. At a high level, these variables record the number of times the a procedure is invoked in an execution sequence from a specific call site. Note that, non-zero value of a proxi variable records the number of (self/mutual) recursive calls to a procedure. An execution step involving return from a procedure is deemed feasible only if the proxi variable corresponding to the return location has the minimum value among all the non-zero proxi variables associated with the called procedure. Proxi-annotated CFG model, therefore, classifies correct call-return pattern of programs without using monitor-stack required for PDS model monitoring technique, i.e., space inefficiency caused due to the monitor-stack is nullified without any loss in precision.
Theorem 1 An execution sequence is classified by a push-down model as feasible ,if and only if, it is classified as feasible by proxi-annotated control flow graph model.
b Figure 7 shows the updates to the proxi variables for monitor-stack operations in PDS corresponding to the example in Figure 6 
Security Broker: Facilitating Security Extensions
Layer 2 allows a user to implement security extensions. In particular, it supports extensions based on specifying and enforcing security policies using a high-level specification language. Examples of such extensions include access control policies, [7, 9] , intrusion detection systems [19, 13] and program confinement [15] .
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Figure 7. PDS Vs. Proxi-Annotated CFG
In order to support different types of extensions, the language must be able to express history sensitive sequences. For instance, in the TinyOS example mentioned earlier, consider the following security policy: component KEY EST can only invoke the command get key implemented by component KEY STORE, when LINK LYR has asked KEY EST to encrypt a packet. Capturing this policy requires ability to express events such as commands (get key), keep track of the sequence of command invocations and relationships between their arguments over time interval.
This rules out regular expressions (regexs) which are widely used in specifying and enforcing policies, e.g., in tcpdump [1] and the BSD packet filter [16] . In particular [5] has proved that regular expressions can only be used to specify safety policies. On the other hand, though general purpose languages such as nesC (similar to C/C++ but for TinyOS) can easily express such policies, the policies are not recursively enumerable (re). This is because nesC has the same expressive power as a Turing machine and hence policy enforcement is an undecidable problem. We developed a language as part of our earlier work on system security [19, 22, 21] , called behavioral modeling specification language (BMSL). BMSL extends the familiar pattern matching constructs of regular expressions to the domain of events with arguments. Security policies specified using BMSL are enforced using an efficient enforcement mechanism called extended finite state automaton (EFSA) [21] . The expressiveness of BMSL policies and the efficiency of pattern matching using EFSA's makes them suitable for developing security extensions for TinyOS. Specifically, BMSL policies have the same expressive power as extended finite state machines, a formalism commonly used in formal methods literature [11] . In addition, experimental results demonstrate that policy enforcement using EFSA is efficient causing overheads of less than 5%, for each . EFSA for KEY STORE security policies command invocation [22] . In the rest of the section, we discuss the policy specification language and its use in our framework. It captures the set of all histories which start with an command/event a whose argument is greater than 3, followed by a sequence of zero or more b's, and ending with command/event c whose argument is less than the value 5. BMSL's have very efficient enforcement models called extended finite state automaton (EFSA) which extend finite state automaton to remember context information across states.
Using BMSL for TinyOS Extension Development.
The observable behavior of two interacting TinyOS components is the set of sequences of commands/events invoked by them. Security policies can thus be specified in terms of these sequences. Using BMSL, we specify such policies over commands and events. While enforc-/* Restriction on getting/setting secret keys */ (get key(src comp) || set key(src comp, key)) ing policies over interactions with a protected component, we add an extra argument, source id (src comp), to the commands/events that defines which component is interacting with the protected component. We developed a security extension which prevents invalid accesses to the KEY STORE component in the example TinyOS application. Valid accesses to the component occur when the LINK LAYR component on each sensor initiates a secure key exchange. Since our research does not focus on the protocols, we assume that it is one of the different protocols currently being used in sensor networks [25, 23] . Key exchange is initiated only when the sensor network is deployed or when a new sensor is added to an existing network. Hence, the key is set in any sensor only once in the KEY STORE component. Once the key is set, it can be used by the LINK LAYR to (en/de)crypt packets which it injects/accepts from the network. Based on this behavior we develop two security policies which are illustrated in Figure 8 and explained below:
No component other than KEY EST can get or set the secret key. If component KEY EST wants to access the key, it can only do so, provided the LINK LAYR has initiated a request to encrypt a packet (using encrypt pkt command) These policies are translated into an EFSA. A schematic illustration of the example EFSA for the policies is shown in Figure 9 . The dark circles representing states , x z and { are final states which trigger the response destroy key, which erases the secret key and p triggers the response term. EFSA is generated as a nesC program, and implemented as part of a com- Responses to violations of security policies. In the above example, functions destroy key and term are used to respond to policy violations. Function destroy key, simply erases the secret key. This ensures that even if the attack succeeds, the sensor is unusable. Hence, the response creates a software tamper resistant mechanism. The reaction term -is more passive, it simply terminates the command/event.
Event Predictor
The purpose of an event predictor is to compute the next possible set of events that can be received by the sensor. In our approach this can be based on knowledge of either the protocol being used or the interaction between components. Once such commands are determined, the event predictors, store pointers to the set of all next "possible" commands (called cached commands). When an external event occurs, such as, receiving a data packet, event predictor first checks if the event can be handled by one of the cached commands of the component. Since the number of cached commands is a subset of the total number of commands, in an average case it improves efficiency in handling the event. This concept is very similar to the associative caches used by operating systems in computer architecture. The event predictor is analogous to the cache replacement algorithm. We use the EFSAs discussed earlier as such predictors. Specifically, BMSL security policies are used to capture the protocol information or the interaction between components. The policies specify the current event and the next possible set of events. The generated EFSAs corresponding these specifications are the event predictors. When an event pertaining to the protocol occurs, EFSAs trigger transitions to the next possible set of expected events. For instance, consider an abstract version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [4] between two sensors^and~as illustrated in Figure 11 . The EFSA for the event predictor is shown in Figure 12 . Key exchange is being performed by the KEY EST component. When LINK LAYR of^invokes the command keychange which is part of KEY EST component, keychange sends some computation to~. The event predictor then expects either a reply from~or a timeout. It switch-offs of all components. When it receives any event, it first wakes up keychange and sends that message to it. If keychange cannot handle the message, i.e, the message is of the wrong type, the event predictor then goes through the entire process of determining the event type. We note that this is a preliminary idea and needs further experimentation.
Conclusions
We discussed a framework which supports: (a) basic security based on identifying deviations on TinyOS component interactions from their actual behavior and (b) a powerful security extension development mechanism based on specifying and enforcing security policies. The efficiency of this layered framework is critical in the setting of sensor security. We presented an optimization algorithm to make deviation detection (a) efficient and precise. In addition, our prior experiments, on policy-based security assurance for traditional operating system, provide strong testimony of its efficient applicability to TinyOS. As future work, we would like to deploy our methodology in sensor network and measure its efficiency in terms of battery consumption.
